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Challenges Facing New Oversight Bodies:
Oversight bodies are integral to a strong anti-corruption framework.
However, even once the process for establishing such a body begins,
countless challenges may be encountered before the agency is up and
running effectively. This brief identifies a few of the most critical challenges
during this process, based on the accounts of agencies including (1) the
Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission (IBAC) of Victoria,
Australia, (2) the Office of the Inspector General of Montreal (Montreal
OIG), and other relevant offices.
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CAPI summer research intern and PhD.
candidate at Cornell University, for her
assistance in researching and writing this
brief.

Each oversight body is unique in its history and attributes, such that a single
set of common challenges is unlikely to exist for all agencies. However, the following, non-exhaustive list presents
some of the major challenges oversight agencies have faced prior to and in the early days of their operations, which
may be helpful guidance for anyone considering the establishment of an oversight agency.
Challenge 1: Political Opposition
“No politician suddenly wakes up one day and decides to make an oversight agency.”1 This sentiment captures the
common knowledge that government bodies tend to resist oversight unless political circumstances require it.
Significant opposition from various sources can pose an obstacle to the establishment of an oversight agency, and
subsequently, the granting of sufficient resources and powers to that agency.
New oversight bodies may face opposition from the upper echelons of government, particularly from those whose
interests may be threatened by an oversight body. Calls to establish an oversight agency often go ignored until a
scandal brings corruption into the limelight, ramping up pressure to set up some sort of formal watchdog. For
instance, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of Montreal was created in early 2014 as a response to a public
inquiry that revealed the proliferation of kickbacks and collusion schemes in the city’s public contracting process.
The investigations led to the resignations of two mayors and the election of a mayoral candidate who vowed to
appoint an inspector general. Likewise, the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC), the first
anti-corruption body in the Australian state of Victoria, was formally established in 2011 following years of repeated
demands for reform, and only after corruption (and police misconduct) became important political issues in the
2010 state election.
New oversight agencies may also face skepticism from government actors who do not understand the need for an
oversight body, or who feel that their bureaucratic “turf” has been threatened by the new agency’s establishment.
Victoria’s IBAC faced a “culture of denial,” including at senior levels of the Victorian bureaucracy, concerning the
extent of public sector corruption.2 Additionally, the courts and certain elements of the police expressed fears over
IBAC’s quasi-judicial authority, especially regarding its alleged potential to undermine the courts and threaten
common law rights.3
Similarly, civilian investigators may face considerable resistance from police unions and their allies who “oppos[e]
the implementation of full investigatory oversight agencies” on the grounds that civilian investigators are biased
against police officers and/or lack the expertise to conduct investigations of officer misconduct. Thus, civilian
investigators “may have trouble penetrating the defensive police subculture that can characterize police
organizations.”
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Challenge 2: Politicization and Lack of Independence
Another significant challenge for oversight bodies is the attempt by outside actors to influence the oversight
process. Early in its establishment, the Montreal OIG feared political parties would attempt to use the agency as a
political weapon.4 The OIG discovered the importance of maintaining distance from politics and launching
investigations based solely on the facts—fortunately, the OIG had been given a sizable and guaranteed statutory
budget to shield it from undue political influence.5
Oversight agencies without a guaranteed budget appropriation or that report directly to the government bodies they
oversee are particularly vulnerable to this sort of undermining influence. Politically unpopular investigations by
oversight agencies can incur retaliation in the form of defunding, threats to remove the head, or closure of the
office. For instance, Chicago’s Office of the Legislative Inspector General (LIG), created by the Chicago City
Council in 2010, shut down within five years after the Inspector General allegedly angered two powerful aldermen
by launching investigations against them. In another case, the inspector general of the Kansas Health Policy
Authority (KHPA) was pressured by the KHPA to modify an audit report and received threats of removal after
speaking independently with legislators. The inspector general, a position created in 2007 by the Kansas state
legislature to conduct audits and investigations of the KHPA, was unfortunately designed to report directly to the
KHPA executive director, allowing the KHPA to interfere in monitoring efforts. Finally, the New Jersey Inspector
General’s Office was shut down five years after its creation, in large part because of politically unpopular
investigations it had undertaken.
Even if an agency avoids political influence, it may not be immune from the courts. Courts often hear and sustain
challenges to oversight agencies’ jurisdiction and powers.6 Even if the challenge is unsuccessful, the lengthy legal
proceeding delays reform. In Australia, a legal battle prevented Victoria’s IBAC from investigating allegations of
excessive use of force by the police at a regional center by more than a year.7
Challenge 3: Budgetary and Personnel Limitations
Oversight agencies frequently face budgetary and personnel constraints that pose challenges for developing a fully
functioning program.8 New oversight agencies inevitably face budgetary constraints, ironically because their budget
is often dependent on how developed their program is.9 As mentioned above, the small or non-guaranteed budget is
one vehicle by which external actors attempt to undermine oversight efforts. Vested interests within city councils
and state legislatures may seek to paralyze oversight agencies by passing miniscule budgets. And on occasion, hostile
actors will attempt to completely shut down an oversight office by defunding it – a problem that the Louisiana State
Inspector General has been contending with for years.
The budget limitations, in turn, make recruiting and retaining personnel difficult.10 Agencies must balance their
budgets but also should select only qualified personnel of various professions in order to investigate and prosecute
different types of corruption.11 The restrictions on budget are thus particularly felt in agencies dealing with
specialized or technically advanced areas, because these agencies must often rely on specialists. Victoria’s IBAC, for
example, reported great difficulty in recruiting specialists such as investigators, intelligence analysts, forensic
accountants and cyber-security experts.12
Challenge 4: Limited Powers
Many newly established oversight agencies can struggle to carry out their duties given limitations to their powers.
For Victoria’s IBAC, a narrow statutory definition of corrupt conduct, strict threshold requirements for
commencing an investigation, the lack of basic powers of arrest, search, and seizure, and other limitations posed a
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difficult challenge for the fledgling agency. For instance, initially IBAC had to be “reasonably satisfied” that corrupt
conduct was presently occurring before it could commence an investigation.13
Despite its relatively broad investigatory and enforcement powers, the Montreal OIG has also faced constraints.
While the OIG has the power to rescind contracts that were obtained by fraud or collusion, it cannot on its own
stop the collusive parties from bidding again, and has no power to impose changes on the bidding process itself. 14
Instead, the OIG may recommend to officials that the offending party be blacklisted from bidding for a certain
period of time, and may also recommend process changes.15 To date, the OIG’s recommendations have routinely
been followed. However, the OIG stated that “we need to remain vigilant to the possibility that one day the
administration might not follow our recommendations anymore, and public confidence in the OIG could have an
impact on this.”16 Attempts to amend the law to grant the OIG even greater enforcement power have been
unsuccessful.17
Victoria’s IBAC lacks the power to enforce its recommendations on agencies. The public sector’s initial “shock” at
the scale of the corrupt conduct IBAC exposed led to a “rush” to accept IBAC’s recommendations. Five years
down the line, however, the watchdog has started to see some resistance, and thus may well increasingly need to rely
on the pressure brought to bear by public hearings and reports.18
Challenge 5: Managing Expectations
New oversight agencies face varying expectations from the public and the government. Some agencies encounter
excessively high expectations: Victoria’s IBAC, for example, often received complaints about matters “clearly out of
[its] jurisdiction . . . We have had to manage stakeholder perceptions of our role and capacity by active
communications and engagement.”19 Even after five years, IBAC still faces a considerable challenge in engendering
a good public understanding of its role and functions.20
Established with considerable statutory powers and independence after a four-year public inquiry unveiled massive
corruption, the Montreal OIG faced incredibly high expectations, receiving calls and complaints even before it
established a formal hotline—the OIG noted that “[it] had to act rapidly.”21 Particularly problematic were the
expectations from the city government that the OIG would pre-approve various contract-related processes. The
OIG’s job, however, was to “monitor the city’s contracts,” not to “act as counsel for the city.” 22 But as Montreal’s
OIG observed, an oversight agency “cannot be everywhere and cannot be informed about all of the situations
occurring within its jurisdiction.”23 This is one of the reasons why the office sees its role in providing training to
elected officials and employees of the city as vital, so that they too can recognize and prevent breaches of integrity
or of the applicable rules in the contracting process.24
New oversight agencies may also face criticism from the public. Initially, certain civil society organizations were
critical of IBAC’s ability to conduct sufficient oversight, given its limited powers, and some remain skeptical. 25
Montreal’s OIG observed that oversight agencies must diligently investigate complaints to “make people feel that
we [are] independent and not a political tool.”26 Failure to act may further alienate the public, whose support is
helpful to agencies as they push reforms and conduct their oversight work.27
Challenge 6: Internal Governance
While many new oversight bodies struggle with constraints imposed on resources and powers, others must take
precautions against their misuse. For those granted broad investigatory powers and jurisdiction, as well as an
abundant budget, developing an adequate risk management framework is a necessary challenge. As Victoria’s IBAC
has observed, “Historically, parliamentary or judicial reviews and inquiries into anti-corruption or police oversight
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bodies have been due to at least a perception of overstepping of powers, or poor internal governance”28 Oversight
agencies must therefore take steps to protect “against potential misuse or abuse” of legislated powers.29
Conclusion
The critical challenges facing new oversight bodies described above are daunting but not insurmountable. With the
knowledge that effective oversight bodies have been able to navigate these obstacles, we hope that those aspiring to
establish such an office will take note of these challenges and use them to develop countermeasures and strategies
for success.
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